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Abstract
A problem facing quantum mechanics is that there are a number of views or
interpretations available that purport to 'explain' quantum mechanics. In this paper I
discuss and analyze the view of relational quantum mechanics by Carlo Rovelli in the
context of theoretical underdetermination. I will show that even though Rovelli offers a
view that consolidates some of the aspects of competing theories it still falls short of
breaking out of the theoretical underdetermination. The criteria that I have used to
consider a theory successful in this context is one that increases the predictive output of
quantum theory. Lacking an increase of predictive output then we can consider how a
view helps solve the paradoxes in quantum mechanics or makes the paradoxes
meaningless. I will conclude that relational quantum mechanics does not attempt to
increase the predictive output and has limited success in resolving the EPR paradox.
What Rovelli's view of quantum mechanics offers is a non-trivial and interesting reinterpretation of the main issues of quantum mechanics that does leave the door open for
further study.
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1. Introduction.

To adopt Kuhn's nomenclature, quantum theory seems to be in a period of 'normal'
science without an accepted paradigm. For once, it seems science has a relatively firm
grasp of the technical and empirical aspects yet, the worldview that the data suggests is
extremely controversial. Efforts to accommodate the theoretical and philosophical
implications of the data has led to some unconventional explanations qua the traditional
worldview of classical physics and even common sense.
A cursory survey of the literature available will immediately impress upon the
reader that quantum theory remains as mysterious as it is empirically successful. The
great physicist Richard Feynman once wrote the following about the apparently
unexplainable nature of quantum mechanics,

No one has found any machinery behind the law. No one can “explain” any more than we have just
“explained.” No one will give you any deeper representation of the situation. We have no ideas about a
more basic mechanism from which these results can be deduced. […] We can only predict the odds! This
would mean, if it were true, that physics has given up on the problem of trying to predict exactly what will
happen in a definite circumstance. Yes! Physics has given up. We do not know how to predict what would
happen in a given circumstance, and we believe now that it is impossible. (Feynman 135)

However, many attempts have been made. In this project I will discuss one of
them; Carlo Rovelli's Relational Quantum Mechanics in context of several of the
principal competing theories. The purpose of this will be to determine what is at stake in
the interpretation of quantum mechanics qua our ability to explain the most basic
phenomena of the natural world.
1

What Rovelli proposes with relational quantum mechanics is a view of physics
that is inspired and, to a degree, analogous to Einstein's Special Relativity. The shared
intuition is the claim that the physical values of a system are are not observerindependent. Thus, as time and space are considered relational, the physical values of
microscopic systems can only determined in reference to a reference frame. The idea is
that just as Einstein changed the way we think of time and space, so will applying the
same idea to quantum mechanics will change the way we understand it. In this paper I
will explore how the concept of systems, relational physical values and the consequent
view of Rovelli's proposed relational quantum mechanics might lead us to reevaluate the
reality of physical values.
In my argument I will attempt to show that Rovelli's account of relational
quantum mechanics can be considered in two different ways. That relational quantum
mechanics not only proposes a solution to some of the problems in the interpretation of
quantum mechanics but also suggest that we should apply the lessons that quantum
mechanics teaches us and adopt them in how we view the world in general. Given this, I
will attempt to show that while the prescriptive interpretation of relational quantum
mechanics falls short of Rovelli's objectives or at least undetermined in context of the
alternative interpretations, the metaphysical account remains a rich alternative open to
exploration by philosophers.

2

2. A brief description of elementary quantum mechanics. 1

To quote Hughes, “A discussion of quantum theory which made no mention of the
two-slit experiment would not quite be Hamlet without the Prince (226)” but it would be
close and for our present purposes, Hughes presents us with a suitable place to start. For
the initial illustration we should imagine an electron gun E shooting at a steady rate
towards a sensitive screen S. In between the source and the screen is a barrier with two
narrow slits A and B. With this set-up, three different experiments will be performed. In
experiment 1, slit B shall be closed and A kept open. In experiment 2, A shall be closed
while B will remain open. In experiment 3, both A and B will remain open.

Illustration 2.1

The results of experiment one displayed in Illustration 2.1 show that the sensor
screen recorded a distribution of discrete ‘hits’ which aligned with the height of slit A.
The second experiment showed a similar distribution of hits for slit B. Both experiments
showed results that would be typical of firing bullets at a wall with a metal screen with
one slit open in between the gun and the wall. Considering Experiments 1 and 2, we
would expect that in the following experiment the distribution pattern of bullet holes
when both slits are open would be the aggregate of 1 and 2 as in Illustration 2.1. Yet, for
Exp 3 ≠ Exp 1 + Exp 2! In fact, the distribution pattern seemed consistent not with the
firing of discrete particles but instead that of an interference pattern appropriate to the
1

For detailed accounts please see [Hughes 1989, Rae 2004, or Green stein 2006].
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description of the behavior of waves.

Illustration 2.2

Illustration 2.3

The effect is in fact quite mysterious in that by only considering the distribution
pattern of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, which display the type of behavior typical to
other macroscopic objects. Yet, the distribution pattern of Experiment 3 in fact showed
instead of the behavior expected of discrete particles that of wave interference in which
the greatest density of bullet holes was not at the height of slit A and B but instead near
the center of the pattern. The results of Experiment 3 are consistent with the behavior of
waves.
Consider how typical waves behave. Imagine if you were splashing around in a
bathtub, eventually you would notice that sometimes waves would have destructive or
constructive interference. That is, when the crest of one wave interferes with the crest of
another, you would see a wave the size of the sum of its two component waves or if the
crest of one wave interfered with the trough of another, you would notice that the size of
the wave would reflect the difference of the amplitude of the two component waves.

4

When the two slits are open, electrons display this same type of behavior. They behave
like waves in that the troughs seen in Illustration 2.2 reflect the destructive interference of
electrons and the peak in the middle of Illustration 2.3 seems to be an example of
constructive interference. Yet, when only one of the slits is open the electrons seem to
behave like discrete particles and the wave interference pattern is destroyed.
Furthermore, suppose we were to do a fourth experiment. In this experiment,
while keeping both slits open, we would reduce the intensity of the E source in such a
way that, for all likelihood, there would only be one electron at a time being shot in the
experimental device. What we would see is that, after some time, hit by hit, the aggregate
of each individual hit would also be that of an interference pattern typical for wave
phenomenon. However, numerous and clever variations of the dual-slit experiment have
been carried out and all have concurred in their remarkable results 2
In order to understand how it is possible it is important that the results of
Experiment 3 is not the mere sum of Experiment 1 and 2 led scientists to design
experiments that would potentially track the path of electrons either through slit A or B.
Whenever an attempt was made to locate the path of the electrons, no matter how delicate
the measuring device, it seems to have affected the behavior of the particles in question in
that the distribution pattern that displayed interference was no longer observed. The act of
observation makes the distribution of electrons different than the distribution of
unobserved electrons.

2

(Tonomura group in 1989, Gähler and Zeilinger 1991, and by O. Carnal and J. Mlynek 1991).
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2a. Heisenberg, Schrödinger and the Measurement Problem.

One of the chief characteristics that differentiates classical physics from quantum
mechanics is that predictions about the conjugate position and momentum are subject to
limitations. This phenomenon of quantum mechanics is known as Heisenberg's
uncertainty principle.
∆x ∆p ≻ h / 4π

6

What the uncertainty principle describes is the relationship between the
uncertainty of position ∆x and momentum ∆p with arbitrarily high accuracy results in an
uncertainty equal to about h/4 where the h represents the universal constant of quantum
mechanics known as Planck's constant. More so, such results are generalizable to all
predictions of position and momentum. The number of failed attempts to get around the
uncertainty principle seem to indicate that the uncertainties in quantum mechanics are not
merely a product of empirical limitations but of something else. Consider this simple
experiment.

Screen

x
Q
P
Intensity

Illustration 2.4

In this experiment we have one energy gun O shooting photons through a single
slit. What the observer would notice is that the the diffraction pattern reflected on the
sensor screen is dependent on the narrowness of the slit. That is, the narrower the slit, the
broader is the diffraction pattern and viceversa. The uncertainty is captured by ∆x, where
∆x is the width of the slit. In this experiment, narrowing the slit serves as a way of
localizing the position of the photon. However, any attempt to measure for the position of
the photon beyond the limits described by the uncertainty principle seems to increase the
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width of the the diffraction pattern. Which in turn, is the measure of the uncertainty in
predicting where in the screen the photon is going to hit (Rae 12 ).
The effects of the uncertainty principle are profound. Trying to describe the path
of an electron seems meaningless. Such is the case, that quantum mechanics seems very
different from classical mechanics. Unlike in classical mechanics where the limitations in
measurement seem to be more about finding the right tools and surmountable with
experimental innovation, quantum mechanics seems to be more about a feature of the
world that limits our ability to define the values of physical quantities in the microscopic
world even with ideal experiments.
Feynman considers that there must be a special way that we must think in order
not to get into inconsistencies.
If one looks at the holes or, more accurately, if one has a piece of apparatus which is capable of
determining whether the electrons go through hole 1 or hole 2, then one can say that it goes either through
hole 1 or hole 2. But,when one does not try to tell which way the electron goes, then there is nothing in the
experiment to disturb the electrons, then one may not say that the electron goes either through hole 1 or
hole 2. If one does say that, and starts to make andy deductions from the statement, he will make errors in
the analysis. This is the logical tightrope on which we must walk if we wish to describe nature successfully.
(Feynman 132)

It seems that Feynman is suggesting that nature is built in such a way that the act
of observing, is the same as the act of physically interacting with what is being observed.
When no such interaction occurs then we loose our ability to claim something about the
physical values of the particles. That is, we must suspend judgment of the properties of
the system until the moment of interaction. Such at it is, it seems to be the case that “in
the standard interpretation of quantum physics the whole concept of attributing a definite
8

position to a particle of known momentum is invalid and meaningless" (Rae 13).
However, not all is lost. Quite the contrary, “the complete theory of quantum
mechanics which we now use to describe atoms and, in fact, all matter depends on the
correctness of the uncertainty principle” (Feynman 132). What we have is a theory that is
very successful in predicting the probability of certain events, i.e. the set of possible
outcomes associated with one specific measurement device (Hughes 195).
Current predictive models in quantum theory are based on Erwin Schrödinger’s
equation. What this equation describes is how the state of the system | ψ,〉 evolves with
time. The way Scrodinger's equation maps the evolution of |ψ 〉 according to the Hermitian
operator H as a representation of the total energy of the system and the time t. Such as,

iℏ

ϑΨ
=HΨ
ϑt

According to the Schrödinger wave equation, the state of the system, | ψ〉, evolves
in such a way that the outcome is uniquely determined as a set of probabilities for the
value measured. Keeping the mathematics as simple as possible, we can measure for the
angular momentum or the ‘spin’ of a two-dimensional electron e that is in a state of
superposition of two complementary, discrete values in any direction. Such that, we have
for any direction a discrete quantity of +½ħ and –½ħ spin which can be determined after
measurement. However, for simplicity’s sake I will refer to them as (↑) and (↓), for which
they form a pair, or (← ) and ( →) if the measurement is done on a different axis. Thus,
we can consider |ψ〉 as,

9

t1 → t2
|ψ〉 =|  | ↑〉 + β | ↓ 〉 → | ↑ 〉

That is, the state of the system | ψ〉, at time t1, before measurement, is in a state of
superposition for two values. That is, either we simply do not know whether it is (↑) or
(↓) or the value of the physical quantity itself is indeterminate (more on this distinction
later). If this were classical physics, we would be content to say that the Stern-Gerlach
magnets3 had merely shown that half of the particles had always been (↑) and the other
half had always been (↓). However in quantum mechanics all we have is that the sum of
the probabilities for the two values, represented by the formula bellow is equal to
probability 1.

|  |² + | β |² = 1

At t2, after measurement, the outcome of the measurement would be a definite (↑)
or (↓) as opposed to a the superposition of the two values before measurement.
Furthermore Schrödinger's equation is also considered linear in that it can be
applied to a single wave function or a conjunction of various wave functions. That is, if
we consider dealing with two wave functions, their sum would also be another wave
function of which it is said there is a dynamic evolution between states from t1 to t2.
However, the question remains, what is that happens at the point of measurement?
To be concise, if Schrödinger's equation describes the superposition of different
3

. Stern-Gerlach apparatus are basically magnets arranged along a specific axis that measure for a specific
value, in this they measure for spin.
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values, say of spin (↑) or (↓), why when measured there is a definite value? Schrödinger's
equation works very well in defining the events in terms of probabilities, however, it
seems impossible to determine the exact values without measuring which in turn destroys
the wave-like nature of the system, the wave function seems to collapse. Consider the
dual-slit experiment where the evolution of |ψ 〉 is described as a wave. One would
suppose that a wave hitting the beach or screen it would 'spread out' yet, upon the
collapse or measurement of |ψ〉 it is localized on a grain of sand or a black dot on a
screen. This phenomenon is what illustrates the collapse of the wavefunction.
Key to understanding, so far as we can understand quantum mechanics, is that
while Schrödinger’s equation maps the evolution of the state of the system |ψ 〉 it does
not assign values to all to all physical quantities in the system. Schrödinger’s equation
does not map the state of the system as we would map say an airplane’s trajectory from
New York to Paris but maps the evolution of the state of the system in such a way that it
gives a measure of the probability of where the plane is at a given moment.
Before measurement all we have is a description of |ψ 〉 in terms of probability,
however after measurement we find that the definite value. In the words of van Fraassen,

The famous measurement problem is that our two descriptions, one of what happens at the level we can
observe and one of the processes as modeled in quantum mechanics, do not match.

11

(6)

2b. Further Problems in Quantum Mechanics

Schrödinger’s equation is usually considered linear and deterministic in that the
future state of the system is determined by the Hermitian operator H and the time t. The
way that Schrödinger’s equation works is that H represents the energy of the system, a
physical value, tied to the parameter of evolution t. Thus, the future state is considered to
be uniquely identified by its present state and the values for H and t. However, typically,
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in order to consider an explanation deterministic it has to fulfill two criteria. The first
criteria considered is whether or not it specifies a unique evolution of the state of the
system which Schrödinger's equation does. However, the second criteria would require
that the values of the physical quantities related to its physical values be fully determined
(Hughes 78).
Consider the following experiment as an illustration of the indefiniteness of
values in quantum mechanics and the measurement problem.

S-G

45

S-G

Stern-Gerlach
S-G

45
S-G

Vertically polarized
Horizontally
polarized

Illustration 2.5
The way the measurement works is that by releasing a beam of electrons, e,
through a Stern-Gerlach magnet the outcome would be that e would be split into two.
Half of the beam would be deflected down, and half of the beam would be deflected up,
hence spin (↑) and (↓). If this were classical physics, we would be content to say that the
Stern-Gerlach magnets had merely shown that half of the particles had always been (↑)
and the other half had always been (↓).
Now, assume that there are two Stern-Gerlach measuring devices each one
measuring the output of the first analyzer . However, the second apparatus is rotated at
45º to z on axis x. That is, the analyzers are set up to measure a different property. Instead
of measuring for (↑) or (↓) they now measure for a different base (→) or (←). In this
13

second consecutive measurement, we would see that for those that had been deflected (↑)
that the beam of electrons is now split further into two separate beams. Because the
second Stern-Gerlach apparatus is now oriented on a different axis the beams are
deflected horizontally where half are (→) and the other half for (←). Thus it would seem
to be the case that the electron beam e had particles with both (↑) or (↓) spin and (→) or
(←) depending on the angle to which the Stern-Gerlach apparatus is set to measure that
is, z or x axis.
Consider then, a third consecutive Stern-Gerlach measurement set to the original
axis of z to the stream of electrons that had already been measured as (↑) and then (→).
Classical physics would predict that since we had already isolated those electrons whose
property were (↑) from those that were (↓), we should expect all the electrons to be
propelled up. However, quantum theory predicts, along with experimental evidence, that
once again, the beam will again be split into two parts with half of the electrons (↑) and
the other half (↓). That is, after measurement, the spin property of e seems to revert back
to a state of superposition. The values remain indefinite.
Typically, the principle behind Laplacean deterministic explanations in physics
have relied on the idea that by knowing the initial conditions of an object and the physical
rules of the universe we could in principle predict future behavior. Such as by knowing
the physical laws and the current state of the system, e.g. the location and momentum of a
particle, we could describe its trajectory and predict its behavior.

We ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state and as the cause of
the state that is to follow. An intelligence knowing all the forces acting in nature at a given instant, as well
as the momentary positions of all things in the universe, would be able to comprehend in one single
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formula the motions of the largest bodies as well as the lightest atoms in the world, provided that its
intellect were sufficiently powerful to subject all data to analysis; to it nothing would be uncertain, the
future as well as the past would be present to its eyes. (Laplace)

And according to van Fraassen,

Modern science recognized determinism as a new criterion: a scientific account of a phenomenon is not
complete until it represents this phenomenon as part of a deterministic process. Supporting this criterion, or
perhaps deriving from its force, was the philosophical creed that the very intelligibility of nature and the
very coherence of experience require their possibility of being conceivable as set in a rigidly deterministic
causal order. (2)

The doctrine of determinism in a nutshell presupposes that by having a universal
function with all the data needed to plug in the formulae it would be possible to predict
the future behavior of a system. Like billiard balls bouncing against each other, a good
billiard player can predict more or less where the balls will go. However, this view has
two hidden thesis; a metaphysical and an epistemological thesis.
According to Hughes, the metaphysical thesis states that there is “exactly one
state w1 of the world at time t1” (75) and an epistemic thesis that we can in principle
“determine the values of all physical quantities in the world at the times in question”
(ibid). That is, there is one state of the world, w1, that is compatible with w0 at t0 and we
can know about it. Both thesis can be considered independently. While it may be true that
there is only a state of the world w where all values are well-defined all the time, it does
not mean that w1 can necessarily be derived from w0 for we might not have all of the
information.
15

Hughes considers the epistemological thesis as the stronger of the two. For one, to
know how w1 is derived from w0, would require perfect knowledge of w1 plus all the
governing laws. If so then we could then calculate w1 from w0. However, because of
natural limitations to our data-gathering abilities such task remains out of reach. Thus, for
those that adhere to a Laplacean determinism it seems a matter of principle based on the
metaphysical thesis and considering the epistemological thesis as a regulative principle.
What Hughes points out is that there are issues with this standpoint even within a
classical framework. For example, by considering the standpoint of a Hamilton-Jacobi
“version of classical mechanics” (75) we would require not only the knowledge of the
entire state of the system but to "comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated,
or, equivalently to know the Hamiltonian function for the entire cosmos" (ibid).
The crux of this line of thought is that even if we only consider metaphysical
thesis as a guiding principle the Hamiltonian approach relies in first-order differentiable
equations; which in turn relies on being continuously differentiable. If there was a
singularity, an indeterminate moment in the universe according to Laplace’s determinism,
we would not be able to account for the link between w0 and w1 and the next state of
events.
Traditionally, mathematicians and physicists have dealt with the limitations of the
epistemic thesis by imposing boundaries in the equations and ignoring what would result
in singularities as non-valid answers. That is, instead of considering the Hamiltonian of
the entire cosmos, we attempt to determine that total energy of a much smaller and closed
system such as an hydrogen particle. However, by adhering to the metaphysical principle
and attempting to circumvent the implications of the epistemic thesis, Laplace and others
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developed a closed system that would fit neatly into the mathematical formulae that
ignores the problematic metaphysical implications that the world might not be
deterministic. Hughes called many of these assumptions ad hoc, i.e., made expressly for
the purpose of making the world fit into our metaphysical presuppositions.
The point being, is that although the sort of Laplacean determinism described
above might be considered impractical even in classical mechanics due to the complexity
of the interactions in macroscopic objects, the principle itself seems to guide much of
scientific behavior and experimentation. For it seems to describe that at least in principle,
it is possible to predict the behavior of systems given enough data and the right set of
tools. Quantum theory on the other hand does not seem to do so, at least not without
further argument or postulates like those made by MWI and Hidden-variable theories
discussed in the next section.
So far, I have attempted to show the richness and complexity of quantum theory at
its most basic level as well as how deeply it has challenged the scientific and
philosophical community to understand the basic building blocks of the world as well as
what is at stake qua the types of explanations and descriptions we can make. According
to the 'no-miracles argument' it would indeed be a miracle that our science can produce
such astounding empirically successful predictions and not somehow latch on to what
'reality' really is.
Yet, it seems that there is little agreement over what the data tells. At the heart of
the interpretations of quantum theory is the question if it is our descriptive power that is
limited by our epistemic access to microscopic phenomena or if those limitations reflect a
natural feature of the world. More so, there are those that believe that by including
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additional postulates or even re-deriving quantum mechanics from alternative postulates
we can come to understand the microscopic world, provide some sort of picture of what
is going on or find a way of cohesively describing the microscopic and the macroscopic.

We choose to examine a phenomenon which is impossible, absolutely impossible, to
explain in any classical way, and which has in it the heart of quantum mechanics. In
reality, it contains the only mystery. We cannot explain the mystery in the sense of
“explaining” how it works. We will tell you how it works. In telling you how it works we
will have told you about the basic peculiarities of all quantum mechanics ( Feynman 117).

3. Relational Quantum Mechanics.

Rovelli believes that this fuzzy world that I have described is the way the world
really is and that we should adapt our preconceived notions of classicality and bring over
those hard learned lessons of quantum mechanics to our conceptual framework of how
the world really is.
Rovelli stakes a cue from special relativity and suggests that,

That common unease with taking quantum mechanics as a fundamental description of nature (the
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measurement problem) could derive from the use of an incorrect notion […] I suggest that this incorrect
notion that generates the unease with quantum mechanics is the notion of observer-independent of a
system, or observer-independent values of physical quantities. (Rovelli, 1)

The idea is analogous to Einstein's reinterpretation of simultaneity and relative
values. Roughly, Einstein's insight in special relativity was that the invariance of the
velocity of light was in conflict with the principles of Galilean relativity and the theorem
of addition of velocities in that, where c represents the speed of light, c+c≠2c. In fact the
only way to account for the constancy of the speed of light was to include frames of
reference. For example, consider an observer O standing in the midpoint M of line AB. If
lightning were to strike at 'same time' it would mean that O observed the flash of the
lightning simultaneously. However, consider observer P that is much closer to A than B.
In the same set of events, where O reports a simultaneous occurrence of lightning, P
would say that A occurred at t1 and B occurred at t2. Thus, according to special relativity,
simultaneity is now dependent on the reference frame of the observer. It follows from
special relativity that the values of time and space are not absolute but relative to a
reference frame and the transformations between inertial frames that preserve the velocity
of light are Lorentz transformations. According to Rovelli, by “abandoning the notion of
absolute values (in favor of a weaker notion of state –and values of physical quantitiesrelative to something), quantum mechanics makes much more sense” (Rovelli, 1).
The supporting idea being that quantum mechanics is essentially correct and that
we should not attempt to correct quantum mechanics but, but rather understand what it
says about the world. The idea is to “re-derive the formalism of quantum mechanics from
a set of experimentally motivated physical postulates” (ibid). To look at what quantum
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theory is and use non-controversial 'postulates' or 'principles.' Thus, Rovelli argues, if we
abandon our preconceived ideas about how the world should be, we are free to learn
about how the world is and that would be as quantum theory tells us it is. Ultimately,
Rovelli argues that we should not believe that there is a difference between the classical
and quantum, he accepts no distinction and argues that relational quantum mechanical
principles should be applied to what has traditionally been demarcated as classical. That
is, just like the notions of determinism and the definiteness of physical values have been
undermined by quantum mechanics, we should consider that for the sake of consistency
all of reality, macro- and microscopic is in quantum mechanical in nature.
In brief his program can be described in broad strokes in 3 steps
(1) Quantum Mechanics is correct.
(2) The current unease with quantum mechanics is the application of observerindependent values of physical quantities
(3) Re-derive the formalism from a set of experimentally motivated postulates.

Although these points will be fleshed out, a few preliminary comments should be useful:
(1) is presupposed without further analysis. Like those that argue against instrumental
interpretations or anti-realists Rovelli assumes the 'no-miracles' argument in that we
would be very surprised, considering the success of quantum theory's predictive power,
quantum theory as is was somehow not a reflection of how the world really is. More so,
according to Rovelli, not only is it the case that quantum mechanics is correct, he also
proposes that it is complete. That is, “quantum mechanics provides a complete and selfconsistent scheme of description of the physical world, appropriate to our present level of

20

experimental observations” (7).
According to (2) can be explained in that Rovelli sees his project as analogous to
Einstein's work in SR. He considers that the methodological lesson to be learned is that
the initial problem with the acceptance of Lorentz transformations was physical
preconception of observer-independent time. He argues that just as Einstein's dismissal of
observer-independent value of quantities resolved the paradoxical nature of Lorentz
transformations, so will the dismissal of the same concept resolve the uncomfortable
nature of quantum mechanics. More so, from (2) Rovelli's states the hypothesis that “All
systems are equivalent: Nothing distinguishes a priori macroscopic systems from
quantum systems. If the observer O can give a quantum description of the system S, then
it is also legitimate for an observer P to give a quantum description of the system formed
by the observer O” (4)
For (3), Rovelli gives two main postulates that “summarize present experimental
evidence about the world” (15). Similar to other attempts to Rovelli, present his view of
quantum mechanics is in informational-theoretical terms 4 where

Postulate 1 - (Limited information). There is a maximum amount of relevant
information that can be extracted from a system.
Postulate 2 – (Unlimited Information) It is always possible to acquire new
information about a system. 5

4

5

For further discussion on how Rovelli's informational-theoretic postulates can be compared to similar
but alternate postulates see Grinbaum, "Elements of information-theoretic derivation of the formalism
of quantum theory"; 18 Sep 2003.
There is a third postulate (3) which is a technical description of how to limit the structure of the set of
questions in terms of the information-theoretic formalism Rovelli derived from Postulate 1 and 2,
however at this point it is not relevant to our current discussion.
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3a. The Details.

To begin with Rovelli's understanding of quantum mechanics we must define
some basic concepts. The first important concept is that of measurement. In his relational
account all measurements must be a physical measurements. A priori means are not
considered measurements because they have no causal power. That is, even though
observer A knows a priori that B is measuring b, such 'knowledge' does not affect
physically b. It follows then that for A to know b, A must be in physical interaction with
b. More so, when A has physically measured b it can be said that A has information of b
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in that there is a correlation between the description of A and the state of b . Such as,

The fact that the pointer variable in O has information about S (has measured q) is expressed by the
existence of a correlation between the variable q of S and the pointer variable of O. The existence of this
correlation is a measurable property of the S-O state.

Consider, if A is measuring for value a, an event would be the set E (in this case
[ ↑, ↓ ]), the possible outcomes associated with the specific measurement device used to
measured a (Hughes 195 and 86-88). Thus, Rovelli would say that an observer O, i.e.
any physical object, need not be conscious or have any special qualities, has information
on events. Furthermore, ‘O’ may or may not include the measuring apparatus or the
epistemic agent carrying out the experiment.
According to Rovelli in ‘II. A. The third person problem’ Rovelli proposes that
we can have two different linear descriptions of events (1) and (2) of the same sequence
of physical events that correspond to two different observers. For example,

For (1)
t1 → t2
α|1〉 + β|2〉 → |1〉

for (2)
t1→ t2
(α|1〉 + β|2〉) ⊗ |init〉 → α|1〉 ⊗ |O1〉 + β|2〉 ⊗ |O2〉
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The way to read (1) would be: There is observer O that makes a measurement in
system S. System S is |Ψ〉 = α |1〉 + β|2〉. At t1 S in the state of superposition of values 1
or 2. After measurement, t2 the system collapses to value 1. In (2), suppose there is
observer P measuring system S-O. According to P, before P measures for S-O, S-O is in
the state of superposition and can be described by the left hand part of equation (2). The
difference between Rovelli's account and others is that P is not considered to be
measuring S, but instead P measures S-O. The result being the right hand of (2). Now
compare (1) and (2) at t2. According to Rovelli, this shows that there can be two
divergent but correct accounts of events that follow from the linearity in equation. Rovelli
explains,

We have two descriptions of the physical sequence of events E. At time t2, in the O description, the system
S is in the state |1〉 and the quantity q has value 1. According to the P description, S is not in the state |1 〉
and the hand of the measuring apparatus does not indicate ‘1’. That is, the status of S – O is in a state of
superposition from P’s perspective and P does not know q of S. (Rovelli 4)

What Rovelli is doing here is very different from usual interpretations. Remember
that Rovelli sees this project as analogous to Einstein's. Rovelli claims, “We could say
-admittedly in a provocative manner- that Einstein's contribution to special relativity has
been the interpretation of the theory, not its formalism: the formalism already existed”
(2). What Rovelli is doing is utilizing Dirac's notation and Schrödinger's linear equations
in a way that includes the observer into the system being measured. That is, (1) is being
observed by O, and that is more or less what we would traditionally expect. An observer
measuring |Ψ〉 = α |1〉 + β|2〉, and one the collapse has occurred O will find the value q.
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The difference between this account and any others is that Rovelli considers the sequence
of events as described by a second observer P. For P, the first observer O is part of the
system to be measured, P does not measure just S, but P measures O-S. In this there is a
linearity, first there is S, but in order to know S, O must measure it. However, now, the
observer O is in a state of interaction with S and to determine the value of the new system
S-O where the 'initial values' of O have changed in the process of interacting with S from
P's perspective.

4. Relational EPR

To illustrate, consider the famous EPR experiment and imagine two spin-half
particles in a singlet state a and b being projected to two Stern-Gerlach measuring
devices (A and B) in opposite directions outside of each other's light-cones. Now suppose
that A measures for the spin of a in direction z. The measurement of A would then
collapse the spin of a into a definite state, either (↑) or (↓) for A as well as for B if B is
also measured in relevant direction. Let us suppose that A measures (↑) and B measures
(↓). This is more or less the traditional EPR paradox (according Bell's 1964 paper and the
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Aspect experiments).
The results of this experiment seem to imply that there is a non-local aspect to
how the collapse of a seems to instantaneously affect b. However, according to Rovelli, A
has no claim as to the status of B because A has no information on the state of B; B is
outside of A's light-cone which precludes the possibility of any physical interaction
between the two. To claim that A and B seem to have a correlation would imply an
absolute observer or that the status of B is objectively real to A. This is exactly what
Rovelli believes makes EPR so mysterious. According to him by denying the notion that
there is an absolute value for physical systems independent of a reference-frame we can
avoid what seems to be action-at-a-distance. The key is to consider that A has no claim as
to the value of B because A has no physical information on B. The only way for A know
the eigenstate of B is for A to obtain physical information of B once the light-cones
intersect.
For Rovelli, “quantum mechanics is a theory about physical description of
physical system relative to other physical systems, and this is a complete description of
the world”. That is,

We do not understand locality as prohibiting the acquisition of information by an observer on a distant
system, but only as prohibiting the possibility that a measurement performed in a region could, in any way,
affect the outcomes of a measurement happening in a distant region. In the EPR scenario we have
discussed, the state of β relative to B is inde- pendent of A’s measurement, but not the state of β relative to
A. Since the existence of correlations between α and β is know a priori by A, the measurement of an
individual observable of α does permit the prediction of the value of an individual observable of β.
(Rovelli, Relational EPR 442)
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To review, Rovelli's project can be described as the blurring of a line between
epistemology and metaphysics. To talk of 'system' S is to describe what O knows about S.
That is, what is the information O has on S. Because of the multiplicity of observers or
reference frames “different observers can give different accounts of the actuality of the
same physical property” (429). Thus, negating the possibility of a single absolute frame
of reference. This is the key idea in Relational Quantum Mechanics that is supposed to
resolve the famous EPR problem and its implications on non-locality. According to
Rovelli, there are two presuppositions that make EPR problematic; that physical systems
have absolute values and locality. Smerlak and Rovelli propose that relational quantum
mechanics can rescue locality by instead weakening the constraints that strong realism
imposes.
Undoubtedly, if one were willing to relax the criteria of realism then we would
have a reason to simply move on. However, before doing so, lets consider the
implications. For one, there is no line that separates epistemology from metaphysics.
Epistemology becomes our first and best tool to develop our metaphysics. What S is, is
S's knowledge of O justified by the event of their interaction. If O has no knowledge
about whether or not the tree has fallen in the forest (S), then O has no right to claim
either way; O remains agnostic. If O' saw the tree fall but O has no information, then the
tree is still in a state of superposition according to O. O can talk to O' but until O goes to
the forest and verifies for herself of the status of the tree O only knows the status of (O'S). There is no absolute state of the tree, it is either standing or timber according to the
observer. That is, for O, her favorite childhood tree is still in the forest because when the
last time she went to visit it a year ago she saw it there. However, for the lumberjack (O')
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that chopped it down, S is timber. In Rovelli's relational account the statement, 'tree S is
timber' has no meaning because it is not anchored in a specific reference frame. There are
two disparate accounts of the state of things. For O, the tree is still standing and for O' the
tree is timber. Both are essentially correct, it is only until O visits the location of S and
confirms it is no longer there, and only at that time, is the status of S confirmed for O.
However, even then the comparison of the two results yields to a different sequence of
events.

What changes instantaneously at time t0, for A, is not the objective state of β, but only its (subjective)
relative state, that codes the information that A has about β. This change is unproblematic, for the same
reason for which my information about China changes discontinuously any time I read an article about
China in the newspaper. Relative to A, β is not affected by this change because there is no β-event
happening at time t0. The meaning of the sudden change in the state of β is that, as a consequence of her
measurement on α, A can predict outcomes of future measurement that A herself might do on β, or on B. Of
course the price to pay for this solution of the puzzle is that the sequence of events as described by B is
different from what it is as described by A. For B, there is a quantum event of β at time t0′ and there is no
quantum event regarding α at time t0′. But the core assumption of relational quantum mechanics is that
quantum events relative to distinct observers cannot be sim- ply juxtaposed. (Relational EPR 437)

Rovelli claims that in this theoretical framework, the results of the measurements
of A and B cannot be juxtaposed and compared from an absolute reference frame. It
would have no meaning to compare the results.
However, let's suppose that to the traditional EPR experiment we append a third
observer C, equidistant from A and B, and both relay their results (information) about
their respective measurements via fax, email, telegraph or UPS. The means are not
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important only that C receives the results in more or less the same time and she would
know that the value of a for A is (↑) and the value of b for B is (↓) and that at one point
they were in a singlet state. There would still be two systems, from two different frames
of reference. All C needs is knowledge of the sequence of events and the measurement
results from the measurement of the two systems.

Observer C

(1,0)
(0,1)
(1,0)

t

Observer
A

(1 Light year away)

Observer
B

Source
4.1 Parallel Systems

Here is the linchpin of whether or not Rovelli's relationism 'explains' EPR.
Accepting the idea of Rovelli relationism with all of its claims about relative frames of
reference and non-absolute values of particles does not seem to answer the simple
intuitive question that EPR poses. Mainly, why the correlation? Observer C need not even
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consider A and B as a single physical system as the original proponents intended. C might
consider them, as Rovelli considers them; two different systems. All that C needs is the
constant influx of inputs from systems A and B of each consecutive measurement.
However, the question would still why are two systems correlated?
Rovelli might object that there is no basis for comparison. In his exposition, he
supposed a linear flow while I propose the comparison of a parallel flow. Two systems,
relaying their information to one observer. Unlike in his description, we are now
considering one observer comparing two systems.
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4a. On Rovelli's Relational Approach to Systems.

Rovelli asks two questions in an attempt to illustrate his relational view.
Does P “know” that S “knows” the value of q ?
And does P know what is the value of q relative to O?

In order to answer those question lets contextualize them according to the wellknown gedanken experiment proposed by Erwin Schrödinger. Schrödinger's devilish
experiment consists of placing a cat within a box. Such box is special in that within it
there is a device that would measure a particle that is 50% likely to decay. The
measurement apparatus is then rigged in such a way that if the particle were to decay it
would release a hammer which in turn would break a vial of deadly poison. Thus killing
Schrodinger's cat S 6. The intent of this experiment was to show that it was ludicrous to
consider S, just like the spin of (↑) or (↓) of a particle, in a state of superposition.
Schrödinger considered that there must be something left unexplained. The cat could not

6

. However, in order not to be accused of being speciesist, instead of stuffing a cat into the black box with
the deadly apparatus we stuff our subject into the same box. Not Schrödinger, he was famous and gave us a
lot of good information so it is just a coincidence that we will designate our hapless test subject in the box
as S and Schrödinger’s name starts with an ‘s’.
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be both alive and dead at the same time.
What Rovelli would say is that before t=1, before O opens the box, but the time
has passed in which the deadly poison would, with a 50% chance kill S, is that according
to O, S is in a state of superposition that is, O has no information of the value of q, the
existential status of S . However, let us assume that O looks into the box and S does
survive. However, according to P, S is neither alive or dead, P has no information of it.
Yet, would it be accurate to say that ‘according to P, S is neither alive nor dead’? Or
would it be more accurate to say that P does not know that S is alive or dead. S surely
knows and O obtains the information when he looks into the box. We would say that
there is such a thing as S being alive, or S being dead at t=1. There is information, S has
it, and in this case it is that S is still alive (which corresponds with his belief that he is in
fact alive). Also, consider that O opened the box and S walked out. According to P, (S-O)
is still in a state of superposition. P has no information either way, but P knows that O
knows whether S is alive or dead. While it may seem to make sense that O has
information of S, to say that O has information of S, even if O does not include an
epistemic agent, once we include one, at a later time which is an agent, we cannot avoid
talking about dispositions of belief.
Considering the context of the cat, and two distinct observers. It seems difficult to
reconcile the idea that the existential status of S is in a state of superposition for P yet
well defined for O. After all, what could P say about S at t2? Is P merely uncertain? Or is
the status of S really is ((↑) or (↓)). What is in superposition? The status of S or the
whether or not P is justified in making claims about S? According to P's frame of
reference, P has no information either way or the right to make any claims about the
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status of S. Considering that P is privy to the sequence of events E but not to the actual
values of S, P knows that O knows whether S is (↑) or (↓). But P does not know if S is (↑)
or (↓) at t2.
Can we justify the claim that the quantum state of S is ((↑) or (↓)) because P is not
justified (has no information) whether it is (↑) or (↓) even if O knows? If we accept
Rovelli's view then the question of the status of S from P's perspective is nonsensical, as
from the perspective of P, S by itself has no meaning.
Now the state of the system (S – O) is in a state of superposition according to P
and that the ‘state’ of the system is purely relational. That is the question of whether (S –
O) is (↑) or (↓) can only be determined according to an outside observer (P). 7
Rovelli insists, “the idea that quantum mechanics indicates that the notion of a
universal description of the state of the world shared by all observers, is a concept which
is physically untenable, on experimental ground”(Rovelli 7). Again, “the absolute state of
affairs of the world is a meaningless notion: asking about the absolute relation between
two descriptions is precisely asking about such an absolute state of affairs of the world
(ibid, 8)” and that, “It is possible to compare different views, but the process of
comparison is always a physical interaction, and all physical interactions are quantum
mechanical in nature” (ibid, 8). We are to understand that all physical systems are
quantum mechanical and intrinsically probabilistically.

7

For Rovelli, there is no such a thing as self-measurement. (see Breuer, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACCURATE
STATE SELF-MEASUREMENT). However, I seem to have been able to sidestep this with the inclusion of epistemic
agents.
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4b. Observers and Self-Measurement

There are two possible problem with the previous example.
By using the word “observer” I do not make any reference to conscious, animate,
or computing, or in any other manner special, system. I use the word “observer” in the
sense in which it is conventionally used in Galilean relativity when we say that an object
has a velocity “with respect to a certain observer”. The observer can be any physical
object having a definite state of motion. (Relational Quantum Mechanics 2)
The way to consider 'observers' is that Rovelli broadens the scope of 'observers'
in order to consider the lamp or any warm physical body as a possible frame of reference.
That is, that warm physical bodies are not privileged because of their intentionality over
other physical objects as reference frames however they are not excluded.
Despite the fact that Rovelli uses the language of observers and what they know
liberally, purportedly Rovelli means that the information received by the observer, a
simple physical system, is that of a the physical interaction shared by all physical systems
in the vicinity. This information can be either electromagnetic energy, fields or any type
of physical interaction between two objects that can justify an observer, a physical frame
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of reference to be in a state of interaction.
For example, as noted by Grinbaum, the idea to derive quantum mechanic's
formalism from information-theoretic principles was initially formulated by John
Wheeler (1-2). Yet, when Rovelli uses Shannon's information it becomes a view abou the
information S has of O, of justified knowledge via physical interaction. It is a view of
what S knows about O and P knows about S-O and its possible values. It is an view that
depends on whether S is justified in making claims about O and P's justification of S-O. It
is a view that if adopted, is trying to teach that there is no meaning to claims that deal
with 'the matter of fact is that S is down' is correct.
Despite Rovelli's objections, one of the reasons I have described Rovelli's account
via epistemic agents into the examples is I imagine analogous to what Schrödinger
intended when he wrote about the infamous Schrödinger Cat experiment and that is to
consider Rovelli's proposal in a light in which it is easier to emphasize some of the
controversial claims in the relational view. For example, the idea that all information has
to be from an outside frame of reference seems unintuitive and sometimes unclear in this
context. Intuitively, O can have information in reference to itself. That is O’s ‘belief that
he stubbed his toe’ and the ‘stubbed toe’ forms a correlation that could be called
information according to the criteria of whether or not there is information i.e. 1 if there
is a correlation between the belief that O's toe stubbed his toe or 0 if the correlation is
false. Hence from O’s frame of reference, he has information of whether or not he
stubbed his toe.
More so, the idea of information and measurement remains mysterious. In
Relational EPR Rovelli explains,
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In the context of the EPR debate, realism is taken as the assumption that, in Einstein’s words, “there exists
a physical reality independent of substantiation and perception”. We call this assumption “Einstein’s
realism”.5 RQM departs from such strict realism. In RQM, physical reality is taken to be formed by the
individual quantum events (facts6 ) through which interacting systems (objects7) affect one another.
Quantum events are therefore assumed to exist only in interactions8 and (this is the central point) the
character of each quantum event is only relative to the system involved in the interaction. In particular,
which properties any given system S has is only relative to a physical system A that interacts with S and is
affected by these properties (REPR 429).

This description, with footnotes referring to Wittgenstein's Tractatus 8 leave the
meaning of 'interacts' and 'affected' vague 9. What it seems to imply is that somehow
information is encoded in the physical interactions between systems and observer.
However this leaves the door open to what is the difference, if any, between an
interaction and a measurement carried out in a laboratory. That is, Rovelli claims that in
order for O to measure S, O must physically interact with S. However, should we
consider S a closed system? That is, if causal proximity is what defines an interaction,
then S is in a constant state of interaction with its environment as is posited by the theory
of decoherence. If that is the case then what is the nature of the measurement-interaction
that determines the relational value according to a specific reference frame? Rovelli can
only claim that,

If A can keep track of the sequence of her past interactions with S, then A has information about S,
in the sense that S and A’s degrees of freedom are correlated. According to RQM, this relational
8

. (6) “1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.” (7) “2.01 An atomic fact is a combination of
objects (entities, things). 2.011 It is essential to a thing that it can be a constituent part of an atomic fact.”
(8) “2.0121 There is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with
others”.
9
The footnotes to Wittgenstein's Tractatus do not help.
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information exhausts the content of any observer’s description of the physical world (REPR 430).

That is, if S and A are already interacting because they are in causal vicinity, how
then is the should we describe the act of measurement? It seems that Rovelli would say
that measurement is merely the reporting of the interaction that is already there. That is,
the measurement is only reporting if there is a correlation in the information between S
and O. However, if we were to consider the dual-slit experiment again, it seems that
something is not quite right. For example, in the dual-slit experiment there is already a
measurement device in the form of the receptor screen and the entire macroscopic
apparatus that encases the microscopic particle. Purportedly, this apparatus represents an
environmental factor that is causally connected to S. Yet, if the attempt is not made to
localize the particle's trajectory the experimental result will show the diffraction pattern.
However, if the localization attempt is made, the diffraction pattern disappears. What is
the difference between both types interactions? For one seems to have affected the system
in a different way than the mere possible environmental interaction. Questions such as
these are problematic for an ontological interpretation of relational quantum mechanics.
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5. Critique

To understand what is missing in this explanation of quantum mechanics it will be
useful to back to Rovelli's comparison to Special Relativity and the kind of explanation it
offers. According to Special Relativity there is no absolute frame of reference. Physical
values for an inertial object depend on the frame of reference in which it is measured.
Such as from frame of reference 1 a rod may be traveling at speed of light and from the
rod's frame of reference 2 it is standing still. Special relativity predicts that from
reference frame 1, the rod will appear contracted, while from frame of reference 2 no
such contraction is evident. Just as Rovelli claims in relational quantum mechanics, the
physical value, represented by the length of the rod, depends on the frame of reference.
Where the two theories diverge is that through Lorentz conversions, SR can predict
exactly by what value the rod contracts according to each reference frame. No analog for
this explanation exists in relational quantum mechanics. Although, Rovelli explains away
the issue of the non-local correlation in EPR by weakening the realism supposed by
Einstein i.e. that physical values are independent observer-independent, Rovelli's
relational view cannot explain why those values are what they are or why there seems to
be a correlation especially when we consider the 3 rd observer.
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In Special Relativity, by knowing the specific initial values as well as the relevant
information of the reference frames it is possible to predict a priori what those values
will be. In a relational quantum mechanical explanation there is no equivalent for the role
Lorentz conversions play in special relativity. That is, while both theories agree that there
are no observer-independent values for the systems in question, special relativity is
superior as an explanation because it can give an account for the 'relational' factor. That
is, in special relativity we can calculate a priori the length and time of an object according
to different inertial frames of reference and not merely suppose that the indeterminateness
of its values is 'relational' or 'observer dependent'.
It might be said that to require the type of explanation SR offers is too strong of a
requirement. After all, quantum mechanics seems to be intrinsically probabilistic and
attempts to circumvent such feature have proved futile. Furthermore, having such an
explanation would in fact make relational quantum mechanics moot. The point is that in
an intuitive sense, something is missing. Something that can not be explained away by
claiming that there is no absolute frame of reference hence no justification for correlating
the values of A and B.
Van Fraassen offers us a clue as to the possible issue,

When frames of reference come into their own, we have eventually a three-level representation: there is the
world as described in co-ordinate independent terms, then the world as described in a given frame of
reference (coordinatization), and finally the world as it looks from a given vantage point with specific
orientation. The first admits of many of the second sort, and the second of many of the third sort. In the
modern era, each level has a certain completeness, in that the higher level is uniquely determined by the
collection of those at the next level plus the transformations that connect them – but also a representation
on the first or second level 'contains everything' in a way that the third most definitely cannot (5).
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The type of explanation Rovelli offers is a mix between the second and third types
and denies the first type of explanations. The way I have reformulated the organization
of the systems would consider EPR in the first level i.e. as the sum of measurements from
different reference frames. Consider the frame of reference from C, this description
would still take into account the relational value of the physical quantities, in such a way
that what is being observed, systems A and B are now being considered from the
composite of the different frames of reference.
There are different ways of discussing 'systems'. Physical systems and 'conceptual'
systems. Conceptual system as a theoretical system. MWI system, Copenhagen System,
Geometry, they are all maps. Like van Fraassen says, illustrations about the world. A
good argument is one that can say that this conceptual system matches that physical
system. A good conceptual system is one that can teach us more about the physical
system. When two competing conceptual systems give us empirically equivalent
predictions, then our choice between them is arbitrary, a matter of philosophical
prejudice. What we want is to receive more than what we put in. Otherwise, they are
nothing more than a language game. And we are free to choose whichever one we want.
At best, the conceptual system will suffice until there is a new theory, say string theory,
quantum loop theory, or any new alternative. We can only know if we were right when
we can compare how well the previous conceptual system applies to new discoveries. If
Conceptual System P 'explains' S, in the way the interpretations mentioned above explain
quantum theory, it will be considered a good conceptual system if it also explains S2 or
whichever new theory is used to explain the universe in the newest edition of Science
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magazine. If P2 is needed for S2, then P1 was the wrong approach. Until then, unless
there is something in P1, an increase in predictive capability, testability, or succes in
resolving paradoxes such as EPR it seems to be a matter of philosophical prejudice. For
all the advocates of each of the 'interpretations' genuinely believe that they are right.
Then, why the difference of opinion? They cannot all be right. It is like a christian
debating a buddhist over which is true, when neither one has evidence for their claims.
Both will suffice until there is evidence for or against each set of beliefs. Such is the
problem of empirical underdetermination.
The alternative notion of 'system' seems to be that of a physical object. However
that is only system in the abstract. What a system S1...Sn is is entirely arbitrary. It is only
limited to what is physical and what it is, its limits, are defined by its relationships with
other physical objects and the frame of reference. The previous represents the
'metaphysics' of relational quantum mechanics, however entangled with it is a strong
epistemic component in that what S is, depends greatly on what O wants to know, on O's
method of investigation, of O's parameters of what is relevant or not in S (say whether
Alpha Centauri is a relevant factor in the spin of a particle). Rovelli blurs the line
between epistemology and metaphysics that it seems to leave open the possibility as to
what the object of inquiry is. That is, are we talking about a system, in terms of an
abstract concept or system as the physical object that is being measured for. Rovelli shifts
between the two in that he seems to presuppose that systems can be closed off arbitrarily
such that they are well defined in when he says that O measures S, and what O and S as
well as P are.
That is, the 'systems' referred to in Rovelli's relational project, especially in
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determining the scope of what a system is, whether or not it includes the observer or the
interaction of an electron with Alpha Centauri, can be either important or irrelevant. It's
substantive value is not dependent on any inherent property but on the observer and his
relationships as we can find other interesting patterns to discuss. That is, the notion of
system can be just as useful if not more to as a pragmatic tool in the day to day affairs of
science. It gives a scientist the ability to denote, to point at what it is going to measure
and then pick a reference frame to determine the physical values.
Where Einstein used Lorentz conversions to figure out how the physical values of
an object can differ from different reference frames, Rovelli's amounts to how different
observers can justifiably have information about different objects. In fact, relational
quantum mechanics solution mainly focuses on what we cannot say. Mainly, in the EPR
experiment, A at t0 cannot say that B is (down). While it was Einstein's original proposal
that quantum mechanics was deficient because such a claim would imply action at a
distance, Rovelli's responds by limiting what is under investigation, the system, and
brackets out the other half of the composite to make the problem go away. For Rovelli,
the solution of EPR and the price for relational quantum mechanics would a local but
loose notion of realism.
It may be that van Fraassen is right in that throughout the history of science the
criteria for what counts as a good explanation changes. That “scientific progress at times
involves precisely the rejection of previously proclaimed criteria” (1) and the response
presented here is merely what he would call the aftermath, “a reactionary philosophical
effort at restoration” (ibid). After all, to 'explain' according to the old criteria would be to
describe events in such a way that the explanation would conform to some sort of
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Laplacean determinism, reductionism, and locality. More or less conform to some form
of realism.10 If so, of the available interpretations the only type of explanation that would
seem to answer the question as to how quantum mechanics works would seem to be a
variant of a Hidden-Variable type of theory, or Bohm type of interpretation that add
further empirical postulates to the formulae. However, these interpretations have also
been found lacking evident by the development of all the other competing theories.
More so, it may be possible that by softening the criteria for realism is that next
change in the criteria for our theories. However, what makes this explanation better or at
least better than the other explanations available? In what way does relational quantum
mechanics make more sense than the Many-Worlds Interpretation, Many-Minds,
Copenhagen approach or any of the others that does not depend on the philosopher's
particular prejudice? Thousands of pages have been written about how do we know
which theory is better than the other and without a doubt many more are going to be
written.
Intuitively I could compare each of the major 'interpretations' offer as a payoff.
Relational quantum mechanics, offers a different framework where locality is preserved
but realism is weakened. But ultimately the question is when we evaluate the
consequences of adopting said framework, what are the benefits?
In essence, what Rovelli proposes is not so much a 'solution' or an 'explanation' of
quantum mechanics but a different framework, a 'language game' or even a new
conceptual system. One in which the old questions do not make sense, mainly 'why the
correlation between A and B in EPR?'.

10

The debate of whether previous scientific theories were closely aligned to realism can be debated.
Consider Newton's gravitational theorie, it was mute as to the ontological status of gravity.

43

6. Conclusion

In one fell swoop Rovelli presents a program of much broader scope than even Einstein's
Special Relativity. That is, while Rovelli applies similar methodological principles that
served Einstein so well, its consequences are much broader than the simple relativization
of the values of quantum particles, but would introduce a new metaphysics of observer
dependent systems that is not exclusive to the microscopic but in fact a general 'worldview' by which to interpret all of physics.
In Rovelli's terms, “My effort here is not to modify quantum mechanics to make it
consistent with my view of the world, but to modify my view of the world to make it
consistent with quantum mechanics. (Relational Quantum Mechanics 16). However, how
broadly should we interpret this.
What I have tried to shown is that relational quantum mechanics offers a
standpoint in that it relativizes all physical values. It brings to the forefront the intricate
relationship between the observer and the observed. More importantly, it raises the
question that measurement is an interactive process that depends not only on what is
being measured but on the measurer in the physical sense. That is, it brings greater focus
to what interconnectedness of all physical phenomena and how those relationships affect
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the systems in question. It teaches how epistemology can inspire metaphysical positions.
However, what it does not do is tell us why we should replace metaphysics with
epistemology. Rovelli simply considers quantum mechanics as fundamentally correct.
Correct in the context that it is rich in producing experimentally verifiable data. In this
Rovelli implies that the criteria for good science is its predictive output over all previous
physical theories, yet if we were to apply the same criteria to its interpretation, we would
find ourselves in a theoretically underdetermined dead-end.
The second criteria proposed to consider the efficacy in explaining quantum
mechanics was that of the ability of resolving or dismissing theoretical paradoxes. In this
case the famous EPR experiment. What I have hopefully shown was that even
reconstituting the EPR experiment according to the criteria set forth by Rovelli it is not
resolved satisfactorily.
More so, even if we were to consider all of relational quantum mechanics valid, it
still does not help us answer the really interesting questions of why are the physical
values relational and more importantly what is it about the relation that makes the values
thus?
Not to discredit Rovelli's 'view' of quantum mechanics for coming short where so
many others have the problem still remains in that so far within the context of the
interpretations discussed here the issue of empirical underdetermination remains a thorn
on one's side.
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